that Jones is relevant to sole-owner cases, they have had few opportunities (and taken fewer)
to allow novel outcomes in the light of it as yet. If this produces a conservative approach it is normatively problematic for cohabitants who make indirect or non-financial contributions to shared lives and remain without statutory property and financial provision on relationship breakdown. This is true even if the constructive trust is not the most appropriate method through which to produce a more normatively justifiable outcome, and even if caution is appropriate in the light of stare decisis.
5 family homes. 17 Detrimental reliance by the claimant was also traditionally required for a constructive trust. While this was not expressly mentioned either by the House of Lords in 18 or the Supreme Court in Jones, it would be difficult to justify the intervention of equity in the absence of such reliance due to the need for some form of unconscionability. It must surely be a vital factor in the court's evaluation of what is 'fair' when imputing a common intention to the parties during the process of quantifying the extent of a party's interest under a constructive trust.
Stack v Dowden
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The requirement was sufficiently fundamental that a mere failure to mention it cannot safely be taken as evidence of its demise.
Indeed, in the post-Jones Court of Appeal decision in Smith v Bottomley, detrimental reliance was considered to be 'a critical element of [the] claim to a beneficial interest in the properties in question…by way of constructive trust', 20 and the outcome partly turned on the point.
21
One of the most difficult aspects of the developing law on the common intention constructive trust is that the two cases most recently decided at the highest judicial level were in substance focused on the quantification of equitable interests held by joint legal owners rather than the establishment of interests. In a sense, the sole legal owner scenario is rather more significant, since it concerns the claim of a legal non-owner who may lack an entitlement altogether while a joint legal owner is unlikely to go away empty-handed. 21 See the text to n 145 below.
6
Following the 1990 decision of the House of Lords in Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset, 22 the common intention of shared ownership necessary to prove a constructive trust could be evidenced either by express discussions 'that the property is to be shared beneficially', 'however imperfectly remembered and however imprecise their terms may have been', 23 or by the implication drawn from 'direct contributions to the purchase price by the partner who is not the legal owner, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments'. 24 In Lord Bridge's infamous words, it was 'at least extremely doubtful whether anything less
[would] do', 25 causing problems with Lees' recent suggestion that any expansion of Lord Bridge's approach is 'not inconsistent' with his comments. 26 A focus on express discussion or direct financial contributions clearly prejudiced those legal non-owning cohabitants who
could not point to express discussions and had made only indirect financial or purely domestic contributions, particularly where those contributions in substance facilitated the acquisition of the equity in the home by the other party to the relationship, 27 often through the payment of one particular regular bill (ie the mortgage). It also prioritised financial contributions in a manner similar to that widely considered undesirable in the context of the resulting trust, 22 [1991] 1 AC 107. 23 Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at 132 (Lord Bridge). 24 Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at 133 (Lord Bridge). 25 Rosset [1991] contributing to the mortgage on the property owned by him. 37 Sir John Chadwick decided that:
'…what [the claimant] was doing gives rise to no inference that the parties had agreed (or had reached a common understanding) that she was to have a share in the property:
what she was doing was wholly explicable on other grounds'.
38
The defendant's remarks to the effect that improvements to the property would 'benefit us both' were held to relate to the couple's quality of life in the property rather than being 'intended or understood to be a promise of some property interest', 39 which is a harsh conclusion even in the light of Rosset. Miss James was denied an interest in spite of Mr Thomas' candid concession that it would be 'fair' for her to have one, 40 although a measure of justice was done in that she was held to be a partner in his business and it was understandable that the Court of Appeal was anxious to avoid imputation even though that is now permissible at the quantification stage following Jones.
In Given the policy objections to Rosset and the fact that the upper echelons of the judiciary have (perhaps deliberately) created uncertainty as to the extent to which it still applies, it would be normatively desirable for the lower courts to move beyond Rosset if necessary in a given case even if they are reined in by a subsequent Supreme Court decision.
That would force the Supreme Court to confront the issue head-on, which would be of general benefit to the law and parties to future disputes even if it would be costly for one set of litigants. The system of precedent may cause difficulties for the lower courts in taking a bold approach, 64 but it is worth noting that Lord Reid as far back as Gissing v Gissing saw 'no good reason' for the distinction between direct and indirect financial contributions, opining that 'in many cases it would be unworkable', 65 and that Lord Walker used the past tense when asserting in Stack that the law had moved on. 
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in both cases, though a rather more cautious view is taken by Yip. 68 It is also the case that the very question considered in this article is itself a considerable cause of uncertainty in the law.
Whatever the correct view of the implications of Jones as regards establishment of interests, and wary of the difficulties in resolving the perpetual normative debate on whether the constructive trust should develop to accommodate more legal non-owners, the main part of this article explores whether the judiciary have in fact taken the apparent opportunity to liberalise the restrictive Rosset approach following Jones.
JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO JONES
The 
20
The fact that the wife was asserting an express or constructive trust over what would otherwise have been her husband's interest while it was seemingly accepted that she already held at least a 50% interest rendered the admittedly complex Garwood case similar to a 'sole name' scenario. Nevertheless, it was self-evidently not a 'sole name' scenario in a technical sense, and it is odd to say the very least that Judge Leaver QC failed expressly to follow the approach set out in Jones v Kernott to be applied in 'joint names' cases. Even from the perspective of genuine legal non-owners, it is worrying that Rosset can still be seen as the sole applicable or even relevant authority (and even then be applied in an incomplete manner) notwithstanding developments in the ensuing two decades or more culminating in Jones.
Garwood's status as a High Court decision cements its weakness as an authority.
Jones was not cited in Rezaeipoor v Arabhalvai either. 78 There, the claimant creditor had a charging order in respect of a debtor's interest (if any) in a flat owned at law by the debtor's sister. Master Bragge had decided (several months before the Supreme Court gave judgment in Jones) that the debtor had no interest in the flat since following Stack the burden of proof was on the claimant to establish one. He also held that the creditor 'had to establish on the balance of probabilities that there was an agreement, arrangement or understanding between the brother and sister that the sister was a nominee, or that the funds for the purchase came from the brother', and had failed to do so. That said, the interests of third parties and the associated policy factors might in practice assume particular importance in some cases of this sort. For example, in some such cases there could be an increased chance of suspicion that the common intention constructive trust is being invoked by some form of 'wrongdoer' to defeat the legitimate claims of creditors or even the state, and it is probably fair to say that the judges deciding them are both under considerable time pressure and less likely to be accustomed to applying the intricacies of the law on common intention constructive trusts than some of their colleagues. This can be inferred from the fact that even Rosset does not appear to have been fully understood and applied in all of the cases considered in this section. Such misunderstandings and uncertainties, while not perhaps surprising, do little for the coherence of the law. This is particularly true since there are cases with similar facts and contexts (analysed in the next section of this article) where Jones was considered relevant, and there are also insufficient factual differences to explain the discrepancy between cases where Jones was ignored altogether and those where it was considered but deliberately not applied.
(b) Liberal Principles, Orthodox Results
In spite of the pessimism about the reach of Jones expressed in the previous section, there have been a number of 'sole name' cases and others in which judges have incorporated its principles into their analysis of the current law notwithstanding their partially obiter status. This is true in 96 Recorder's questionable assertion that while this was a domestic case, 'the principles to be applied to a constructive trust were the same whether the parties were in a relationship such as that of husband and wife or were business associates, though the court might draw different inferences as to their conduct in the latter case'. 109 Gallarotti is not, therefore, a particularly useful authority.
Smith v Bottomley is another problematic Court of Appeal judgment in terms of its legal
analysis, partly because the Court did not engage in any substantive analysis of the common intention question and simply relied on that of Judge Shaun Spencer QC at first instance. For his part, the judge below had held that 'Ms Smith's claim...depended completely on the express promise made to her by Mr Bottomley', citing Lloyds Bank v Rosset, and that on the facts 'no inference could be drawn from the parties' conduct of any wider common intention to share property'. 110 The very fact that a 'wider common intention' was in principle considered relevant nevertheless suggests a Jones-inspired approach. Moreover, the claimant appears to have placed specific emphasis on 'promises' in her pleadings, and the case ultimately turned on problems with the parties to a relevant common intention, the timing of promises and detrimental reliance rather than the existence of a common intention between the two cohabitants. In any event, the Court of Appeal could certainly be criticised for failing to provide clarity on the common intention point. Thompson v Hurst is a more difficult case to categorise within the framework adopted by this article, 129 largely because of a lack of clarity in the judgment of District Judge Spencer at first instance (as summarised by the Court of Appeal). It involved the shared home of the appellant and respondent couple, which was ultimately purchased by the respondent using a right-to-buy discount. The judge found that there was 'a common intention on the part of the appellant and the respondent, communicated to each other…, that they would buy the Property jointly'. 130 The couple were nevertheless advised that because of the appellant's patchy employment history, the respondent should apply for the acquisition mortgage alone.
The property was also purchased in the 'sole name' of the respondent. While the judge was 32 seemingly 'satisfied…that there was a common intention that the appellant was to have a beneficial share in the Property' notwithstanding the change of plan regarding the legal ownership, 131 in the very next paragraph she mysteriously held that 'there was no common intention about the beneficial aspect because neither of them thought about it'. 132 In the Court of Appeal, Etherton LJ confessed to having 'some difficulty in understanding' the judge's conclusion that there was a common intention as to shared ownership given her finding that the parties had given no thought to the beneficial ownership, 133 although he was unable to disturb it. Etherton LJ also described the judge's decision as one that the common intention 'was to be inferred' from their original intention about shared legal ownership, in spite of the presence of express discussions.
134
It may be that while express discussions took place as to the legal ownership of the property in Thompson, the judge somehow found that there was no express discussion relevant to the equitable ownership in the light of the decision to alter the transaction. While on this analysis a novel outcome could have been reached as compared to Rosset since the judge declared that the (eventual) appellant had a 10% share, the distinction between the types of discussion seems a remarkably fine one. Given the suggestion that express discussions of some sort took place, and the possibility that the judge meant merely that the parties had given no thought to the quantum of the equitable interests, it seems likely that Thompson can be seen as consistent with Rosset in spite of the apparent absence of direct financial contributions either to the deposit or the mortgage on the part of the appellant. In any event, the appeal ultimately concerned the quantification of the appellant's beneficial interest 
33
(specifically his unsuccessful claim that it should be 50% because of the original intention to put the property in joint names), and there was no cross-appeal as to whether he should have any beneficial interest at all. Thompson is not, therefore, a strong authority for the proposition that the Rosset restrictions no longer apply to 'sole name' cases.
Taken together, however, Gallarotti and Thompson appear to suggest that at least a Jones-inspired approach can lead to a successful claim by a legal non-owner in the context of both conjugal and non-conjugal personal relationships.
(iii) UNSUCCESSFUL COURT OF APPEAL CLAIMS
Not all legal non-owners have been so successful before the Court of Appeal as the claimants in Gallarotti and Thompson. In Geary v Rankine, 135 Mr Rankine had moved from the home he shared with Mrs Geary in London to Halifax in order to run the guest house of which he was the legal owner and for which he had provided the purchase price. After a short time Mrs Geary moved there to assist him. It was seemingly common ground that he limited the amount of provision he made for her beyond housekeeping money because she was initially still married to a third party and he feared claims on any such provision by her husband and the children of that marriage. Mrs Geary asserted that when she questioned him about her future security and that of their son, Mr Rankine would say it was best for the business to remain in his 'sole name' so that she could build it up again if he went bankrupt, and that eventually he would
give no response to such questions or give a non-committal one.
Mrs Geary's counsel conceded that no relevant common intention existed at the time the guest house was purchased, but submitted that the common intention of the parties had subsequently changed. Lewison LJ emphasised that there must be a genuine common 135 [2012] EWCA Civ 555.
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intention, 'that is, an intention common to both parties'.
136
He considered it an 'impermissible leap' to move from finding a common intention that the parties should run a business together to one that they were both beneficial owners of a business property for which one of them had paid. 137 Lewison LJ's analysis attaches significance both to 'who pays for what' 138 and also to express discussions, suggesting that the Rosset factors ultimately came to the fore even in the post-Jones era at least in a quasi-commercial case. He was unconvinced that Mr Rankine had any intention that Mrs Geary should have an interest. He had refused to 'recognise' her until she got divorced for reasons that Lewison LJ considered to be rational, and she had not done so until six years after the property was acquired.
139
Lewison LJ also pointed out that Mr Rankine was deliberately non-committal when she asked about her future security, which was again 'inconsistent with an intention on Mr Rankine's part In 149 This is true in spite of Dixon's downplaying the significance of the fact that Janet's conduct was the payment of money, emphasising that Jones was 'treated as the applicable authority' and asserting that 'it is difficult to see a return to the Rosset approach now that the genie is out of the bottle', 150 an argument fortified by the references to Jones in appellate sole-owner cases considered above. 151 In the end, Holman J concluded that the parties in CPS v Piper inferred a common intention that Janet had a 50% interest in Heathfields Farm.
the wife. 152 One issue to be decided was whether the wife had a beneficial interest in the home at the time it was purchased. All of the purchase money for the house was provided by the wife's mother, and the Registrar found that the mother had intended the purchase money to be a gift to the husband and the wife equally. The Registrar held that the purpose of the gift and the use of it for that purpose, coupled with the fact that the wife contributed to the purchase price via the gift, meant that 'it is to be inferred…that there was a common intention to share the beneficial interest equally' at the time of the transfer. 153 He accepted that the house was put into the husband's name in case he needed to use it as security for small business loans. When assessing the bona fide nature of the parties' later agreement to transfer the house into the name of the wife, the Recorder focused on the Insolvency Act rather than any argument that the husband retained a beneficial interest after the transfer. 160 In spite of his conclusions on the facts, it is significant for present purposes that Judge
Halpern considered improvements and business contributions to be at all relevant to the establishment of a beneficial interest, both of which appear inconsistent with Rosset. This is true even though the judge doubted that improvements made before Mrs Vigh had used her right-to-buy discount (and therefore while she was still a council tenant) could give rise to a beneficial interest and noted the possibility that the claimant's alleged business contributions were 'so remote' from the property that they could not give rise to a beneficial interest. 161 Finally, the context of Aspden v Elvy involved Outlaithe Farm, which included Outlaithe Barn. 162 In contrast to many of the lower court cases considered in this section, it concerned a genuine dispute between former cohabitants, which essentially related to the barn. The judge refused to find that the parties had a common intention to share the farm at the time it was acquired, since the non-owner Ms Elvy had paid none of the outgoings and (by her own admission) 'there were no express discussions as to any interest she might have'. 173 and his example of a legal non-owner who afterwards 'used a legacy to build an extra floor to make more room for the children'. 174 In Griffiths LJ's view the 'obvious inference' in those circumstances would be an agreement that the legal non-owning partner 'should acquire a share in the greatly increased value of the house produced by her money'. 175 Judge Behrens held that 'the contributions made by Mr Aspden are akin to the case envisaged by Griffiths LJ'.
176
The complicating factor is that the citation of Bernard may itself undermine the suggestion that Judge Behrens was moving on from Rosset. The judge had himself found Aspden to older authority more liberal than it in a manner that affected the outcome of the case.
In the light of the number of cases producing orthodox results, the degree of internal incoherence caused by Judge Behrens' own conservative conclusion on the farm and the doubts about whether the recognition of improvements really is novel, however, Aspden is not a particularly unequivocal sign of developments to come in dispensing with Rosset. It could be unfair to say that the Court of Appeal and the lower courts have already squandered the apparent opportunity to consign Rosset to history, even if they could be criticised for their lack of clarity on the point, since in the cases arising so far they did not always need to move was perhaps inevitable in the light of the stare decisis principle. 185 It is unclear whether the paucity of reported cases with the potential to facilitate a novel outcome, which admittedly reduces the scope for those decided cases to be regarded as unjust, can be explained by mere coincidence, a reluctance to litigate given the uncertainty on whether a legal non-owner will
gain an interest at all, or a genuine absence of difficulty in meeting the Rosset criteria on the part of most modern legal non-owning cohabitants. 
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beyond Lord Bridge's criteria, and the particular factual configuration of cases may become more influential than it currently appears to be. Given the current political climate, 187 a relevant Supreme Court decision somehow seems more likely than a move to provide a statutory remedy for a non-legal-owning cohabitant, even if such a scheme would be much more desirable.
